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I. INTRODUCTION
The powers delegated... to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are
to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be ex-
ercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign com-
merce .... The powers reserved to the States will extend to all the objects which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and
the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
-James Madison
Two football players rape an eighteen-year-old college student.2
A high-school senior carries a concealed handgun into a school build-
ing.' An arsonist burns down a trailer occupied by an interracial cou-
ple.4 An armed robber, after burglarizing the home of a couple and
their handicapped child, speeds off in the family's Suburban.'
All of these crimes are local in nature. It seems obvious that
each perpetrator would be hauled down to the local courthouse and
indicted under applicable criminal law. One naturally assumes that
the law would be a state statute. Yet, these perpetrators will not only
face state criminal prosecution but also trial and punishment under a
federal criminal statute. In response to public outrage at crime and
the need to control persons who commit these crimes, Congress en-
acted an array of national criminal statutes to punish such criminals.
Without a national police power, Congress purportedly passed such
laws under the power granted to it by the Commerce Clause." Good
causes for legislation-but is it constitutional?
The Supreme Court attempted to provide an answer, or at least
part of one, in the 1995 case United States v. Lopez.7 The Court an-
nounced the first limitation on the Commerce Clause power since that
power reached its zenith when the Court upheld the 1964 Civil Rights
Act as a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause.! However, Lopez did not clearly explain the standard that
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 132 F.3d 949, 953 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated
on reh'g en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom., United States v. Morrison,
68 U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1999) (No. 99-5).
3. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
4. See United States v. Ramey, 24 F.3d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1994).
5. See United States v. Romero, 122 F.3d 1334, 1336-37 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 1310 (1998).
6. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power "[to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes!).
7. 514 U.S. 549.
8. See Katzenbach v. McClung (Ollie's Barbeque), 379 U.S. 294, 301-05 (1964) (construing
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as broad enough to include enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
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lower courts should apply when faced with a lack-of-commerce-clause-
power challenge. The absence of a clear standard leaves courts with
three choices: (1) construe the Commerce Clause as if Lopez never ex-
isted; (2) apply Lopez stringently to invalidate statutes; or (3) apply
Lopez in a manner that generally finds statutes constitutional. Lower
courts have chosen either option one or three, with only a few excep-
tions.' Courts' hesitancy to find statutes unconstitutional implies no
real limit on Congress's Commerce Clause power.
Lopez surprised many scholars, prompting a rampage of com-
mentary on the decision and the constitutionality of particular federal
statutes.' ° This Note concentrates on two federal statutes that have
recently faced Commerce Clause challenges: the Violence Against
Women Act" ('VAWA"), now on certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court, and the Clean Water Act. 2 It attempts to find a common
thread among federal criminal statutes in order to create a principled
standard for interpretation of the Commerce Clause. This Note rec-
ommends the use of functional analysis to interpret the Constitution's
grant of power to Congress under the Commerce Clause. Without a
clear, functional standard, Congress will continue to enact federal
criminal statutes that invade the police power of the states and gener-
ate more backlog in the federal courts under the guise of a sweeping
Commerce Clause. 3 The Commerce Clause vests power in the na-
tional government to regulate only when necessary to maintain or re-
spond to an integrated national economy. 4 The public appeal of leg-
islation on "good causes" should not override the constitutional limita-
tions of the Commerce Clause.
To ascertain an accurate understanding of the meaning of the
Commerce Clause, Part II of this Note traces the development of the
9. See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Susan M. Bauerle, Congress' Commerce Clause Authority: Is the Pendulum Fi-
nally Swinging Back?, 1997 DET. C.L. REV. 49, 93-121; John P. Frantz, The Reemergence of the
Commerce Clause as a Limit on Federal Power: United States v. Lopez, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 161, 161-74 (1995); Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive
Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 761-800 (1996); Ste-
phen M. McJohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid Commerce Clause, 34
DUQ. L. REV. 1, 23-39 (1995); Sheila A. Mikhail, Reversing the Tide Under the Commerce Clause,
86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1493, 1513-38 (1996); Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional
Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional Theory, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 845, 850-51 (1996).
11. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The VAWA provides that "[a]ll persons within the United
States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender." 42 U.S.C. §
13981(b) (1994).
12. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
13. See infra notes 94-111 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
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clause. It follows the expansion of Congress's power under the Com-
merce Clause during the 1960s, when the Court allowed Congress
enough power to enact the Civil Rights Act. It also details the most
important Commerce Clause case in the last few years, United States
v. Lopez, which created a potential limit on the reach of the Commerce
Clause and suggested a trend toward a more limited understanding of
the clause.
Part III describes Congress's expansive use of the Commerce
Clause to nationalize crimes, including car jacking, violence against
women, environmental crimes, and drug possession. It describes the
effect of the nationalization of crime on the court system and the
states' police power. After describing the disadvantages of the current
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, this Note recommends a solu-
tion. Functional analysis provides a better definition of the Commerce
Clause than the amorphous construction presently in use-a defini-
tion that trial and appellate courts can use. It recommends an inter-
pretation that allows the national government to regulate only those
things germane to the integrated national economy. This interpreta-
tion restricts the current understanding of the power of Congress in
the criminal arena and allows the states to regulate using their police
power.
Part IV compares and contrasts two different federal statutes:
the VAWA and certain criminal aspects of the Clean Water Act. In
recent years, defendants have challenged both statutes as transcend-
ing the Commerce Clause power." Courts overturned convictions un-
der both statutes because of unjustified congressional reliance on na-
tional power under the Commerce Clause. While producing the right
result under functional analysis, the courts' reasoning illustrates a
need for a standard that lower courts can effectively apply. Finally,
this Note analyzes both laws under the Lopez standard and Part III's
functional analysis. By juxtaposing these paradigms, the advantages
of functional analysis and the disadvantages of Lopez come into view.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. The Framers'Foundation
The intent of the Framers of the Constitution serves as a natu-
ral starting point for reaching an understanding of the Commerce
15. See infra Part IV.A-B.
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Clause. Unfortunately, the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia
included little discussion of the Commerce Clause's purpose.'6 How-
ever, historians have gathered a few salient facts. Evidently, at-
tendees at the Convention sought to provide Congress with a power
sufficiently general enough to allow import and export of foreign goods
without burdensome or conflicting state legislation.'" To accomplish
this end, the Convention anticipated three types of legislation: (1)
navigation acts, (2) tariffs, and (3) acts preventing states from impos-
ing duties upon articles imported from or through other states." The
Framers hoped that these types of legislation would help America
form a strong economy and make it an attractive destination for for-
eign commerce.'9 While the wording shows that the Convention an-
ticipated other regulations on commerce, nothing in the record hints
at what the Framers thought those regulations might be.'0
Despite the dearth of detailed discussion on the Commerce
Clause itself, the Framers did discuss the overall delegation of powers
in Article I, Section 8, at length.' The powers granted to Congress
included those to lay and collect taxes, regulate commerce, coin
money, and declare war.' The full Convention twice approved lan-
guage giving Congress power "to legislate in all cases to which the
separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the
United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legis-
lation. ' Of course, this language did not appear in the final Constitu-
tion. The Convention referred the proposal to the Committee on De-
tail for discussion. Ten days later, the committee reported back to
the full Convention with the enumerated powers now found in Section
8 of Article L.' The Convention did not discuss the Commerce Clause
again, despite minor changes in wording.
16. See E. PARMALEE PRENTICE & JOHN G. EGAN, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 2-9 (1898).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. Seeid. at3.
20. See id. at 8. James Monroe commented that a grant of power under the Commerce
Clause to Congress involved "a radical change in the whole system of our government." Id. at 9.
21. See Notes of James Madison (May 29, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter THE RECORDS]; see
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Third Translation of the Commerce Clause: Congressional Power to
Regulate Social Problems, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1210 (1998).
22. See U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8.
23. Notes of James Madison (May 29, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS, supra note 21, at 21; see
Merritt, supra note 21, at 1210.
24. See Official Journal (July 26, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS, supra note 21, at 117-18; Mer-
ritt, supra note 21, at 1211.
25. See Notes of James Madison (Aug. 6, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS 181-82. See Merritt, su-
pra note 21, at 1211.
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The Framers repeatedly stated that the Constitution reserved
power over internal functions to the states.' They rejected unlimited
national power and emphasized that the delegated powers of the na-
tional government were specifically enumerated in the Constitution.'
These statements indicate the Framers' condemnation of sweeping
congressional powers, including the commerce power."8
Without any direct discussion by the Framers of the meaning of
the Commerce Clause, one can turn to four sources for interpreting
that provision: (1) the text of the Constitution; (2) the legislation the
Framers thought Congress would pass under that power; (3) the refer-
ral to committee of Article I, Section 8; and (4) the Framers' under-
standing of federalism. These sources suggest a power focused on for-
eign, rather than interstate, commerce.' The grant of interstate
commerce power was designed to enable regulation in furtherance of
the purpose of the Commerce Clause-the promotion of foreign com-
merce." Fostering foreign commerce demanded preventing the states
from regulating the economy in ways that disabled other states from
engaging in trade with foreign entities.3 Accordingly, the interstate
commerce power permitted the national government to prohibit states
from discriminating against other states in ways that would fragment
the American economy along state borders." As a related safeguard,
vesting the interstate commerce power in the national government
enables Congress to regulate commerce when the integrated national
economy created to further foreign commerce disables states from in-
dependently instituting sound regulatory policies.33 The sequence of
events surrounding the passage of Article I, Section 8 indicates that
26. See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 131 (1987).
27. See id.
28. See id.
The Founders' anxiety to safeguard the States' police powers-protection of the health,
safety, and morals of their citizens-from federal 'intermeddling' is well documented. It
should require more than the colorless 'commerce among the several states' to demon-
strate their intention sub silentio to act in derogation of assurances to allay such fears.
Id. at 140-41.
29. The Commerce Clause points toward regulation of foreign commerce because all three
types of hypothetical legislation proposed by the Framers were designed to eliminate strains on
foreign commerce. The Framers' federalist views indicate that they would not have passed a
broad interstate commerce power that invaded the police power of the states. Combined, both of
these portend a broad foreign commerce power and an interstate commerce power for use only to
aid foreign commerce. See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Conven-
tion and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 451-59 (1941) (stating that the
Commerce Clause was intended to cover navigation and maritime affairs).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
276 [Vol. 53:271
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the Framers wanted to grant the national government power under
the Commerce Clause over activities the states could not effectively
regulate on their own."'
B. Judicial Interpretations of the Commerce Clause
The reasoning contained in most judicial construction of con-
gressional power under the Commerce Clause falls into two broad
categories. The first variety relates to the interstate transportation of
items, or the transportation of "fill in the blank" across state lines.
The second interpretation is less objective and tangible. It requires
proof of a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The jurispru-
dence that created these two interpretations began its development
with the first Commerce Clause power challenge in 1824. The discus-
sion became heated at the turn of the century and continued to evolve
until the mid-twentieth century.
1. Pre-Civil Rights Act Interpretation
Gibbons v. Ogden,35 the first Commerce Clause challenge, did
not spark as much controversy as the cases that bombarded the Court
in the early 1900s. The Supreme Court worked from a "clean slate" in
deciding this case because of the lack of discussion during the Consti-
tutional Convention." The Court, per Chief Justice Marshall, gave the
word commerce a broad and comprehensive meaning, allowing Con-
gress enough power to deal with economic problems in the young
country." Gibbons provided the first hint that judicial interpretation
of the Commerce Clause would run counter to assurances made by the
Framers that they had preserved the states' control over internal af-
fairs.3
8
The first major controversy erupted in 1903 with Champion v.
Ames, in which the Court addressed the constitutionality of a federal
statute prohibiting the transportation of lottery tickets across state
lines.3 ' The Court ruled that the carrying of an item of value from one
34. See Merritt, supra note 21, at 1210. Merritt argues that this is the only "plausible in-
terpretation" of the history of Article I, Section 8. See id.
35. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
36. See PAUL R. BENSON, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, 1937-
1970, at 21 (1970).
37. Id.; see Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 76 ("[T]he power of Congress is 'to regulate com-
merce.' The correct definition of commerce is, the transportation and sale of commodities.!).
38. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 20-25; see also BERGER, supra note 26, at 133-41.
39. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 321-25 (1903).
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state to another constituted interstate commerce." Personal liberty
did not include the freedom to introduce into commerce an element
injurious to the public morals."' From this notion, the Court created
the black letter principle that the transportation of any item across
state lines constituted interstate commerce and was thus subject to
regulation by the national government. 2 This formalistic decision
represented the first major encroachment on state powers via the
Commerce Clause.
This black letter principle allowed the national government to
assert control over moral decisions, instead of letting each state de-
termine the morality or immorality of various activities. It approved
the creation of a national standard of morality.4' If lotteries truly "of-
fen[ded] the entire nation," as the Court declared," then each state
could have just as easily passed a law banning them. The Court did
not discuss the necessity of having a national rule on this issue to en-
sure the steady and productive flow of commerce. Instead, it created a
definition of interstate commerce that allowed Congress to dictate a
national morality as long as the offensive behavior involved some form
of movement across state lines.'
The Court continued to apply this standard in subsequent
cases. In Caminetti v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the
Mann Act, which prohibited the transportation of women across state
lines for immoral purposes."' Because it involved the transportation of
an item (a woman) across state lines, the proscribed activity fit within
the definition of interstate commerce. 7 The Court again did not ex-
40. See id. at 345.
41. See id. at 357.
42. See id. at 345.
43. See id. at 358. The Court wrote:
If the carrying of lottery tickets from one state to another be interstate commerce, and if
Congress is of opinion that an effective regulation for the suppression of lotteries, carried
on through such commerce, is to make it a criminal offence to cause lottery tickets to be
carried from one state to another, we know of no authority in the courts to hold that the
means thus devised are not appropriate and necessary to protect the country at large
against a species of interstate commerce which, although in general use and somewhat
favored in both national and state legislation in the early history of the country, has
grown into disrepute and has become offensive to the entire people of the Nation. It is a
kind of traffic which no one can be entitled to pursue as of right.
Insert cite
Id.
44. Id.
45. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of state regula-
tory action, including fostering experimentation by various states in dealing with problems of
national significance).
46. See White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1994)); Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 482-96 (1917).
47. See Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485-86, 491.
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plore the need for a national rule on the transportation of women or
why the states could not pass their own laws regulating, presumably,
the use of women for immoral purposes. The rule for the Supreme
Court was simple: if it passed over state lines, it fell within the range
of congressional power. Functional analysis was absent. The Court
ignored the question of whether effective regulation of the targeted
evil demanded action by the national government instead of the sev-
eral states.48
The black letter rule was easy to apply. If something moved
across state lines, Congress had the power to legislate under the
Commerce Clause. If there were no transportation across state lines, it
could not. Yet unusual fact patterns soon revealed the inadequacy of
the rule. Hammer v. Dagenhart held a law barring the transportation
in interstate commerce of goods produced in factories employing chil-
dren unconstitutional. 9 The Court found that the law did not regulate
transportation across state lines but instead aimed to standardize the
legal age of employment.'
While this result follows the black letter principle developed in
Champion and Caminetti, the Court did not recognize that a national
rule on minimum age of employment was needed to sustain any such
regulation in an integrated national economy.5' By focusing only on
48. The federal government's power over interstate commerce is complete. The Constitution
contains no exceptions that reserve for the states any power over interstate commerce. Justice
Marshall defined the commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden: "It is the power to regulate; that is,
to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power.., is complete in itself,
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are pre-
scribed in the constitution." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824). Thus, the defi-
nition of "commerce" becomes the only limitation on the power as long as an item crosses state
lines.. If the definition ignores the question of whether a law needs to come from the national
government or could come from the states, the courts applying the Commerce Clause will ignore
it, too.
49. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 268-77 (1918).
50. See id. at 271-72. The Court wrote:
In [Caminetti and Champion] the use of interstate transportation was necessary to the
accomplishment of harmful results.... This element is wanting in the present case. The
thing intended to be accomplished by this statute is the denial of the facilities of inter-
state commerce to those manufacturers in the States who employ children within the
prohibited ages. The act in its effect does not regulate transportation among the States,
but aims to standardize the ages at which children may be employed in mining and
manufacturing within the States.
Id.
51. Hammer was overruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-17 (1941). The
Court held that
the thesis of the [Hammer] opinion that the motive of the prohibition or its effect to con-
trol in some measure the use or production within the states of the article thus excluded
from the commerce can operate to deprive the regulation of its constitutional authority
has long since ceased to have force.
Id. at 116.
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"interstate," rather than "interstate commerce," the "transportation"
principle established by those early cases did not heed the underlying
concern of the clause. States could not by themselves regulate the
employment of children while participating in a national economy. A
race to the bottom would occur as each state set its own laws on the
age limit for working children to attract manufacturers willing to lo-
cate in the state with the lowest limit.2  To prevent such harmful
competition among the states for manufacturers from frustrating the
ability of any state to pursue such a policy objective, the national gov-
ernment needed to craft a national standard.' The states simply
could not address such a problem individually. The black letter
"transportation" principle required the Court to look for transporta-
tion across state lines. It did not allow for analysis of whether the
states could manage the issue on their own or whether the realities of
the integrated economy demanded national intervention.
The limited applicability of the "transportation" principle and
the desire to accommodate New Deal legislation led the Court to de-
velop another interpretation of the Commerce Clause.' The new rule
allowed Congress to regulate intrastate activities as long as they bore
a "close and substantial relationship" to interstate commerce.' The
expansion of the Commerce Clause to intrastate activities dealt a
"blow" to dual sovereignty.' Congress could now reach manufacturing
activities previously considered local and subject only to state police
power. The Court warned that the scope of the power must be con-
52. The race to the bottom-or top, depending on one's perspective-has occurred in other
areas. For example, in corporations law, Delaware maintains favorable laws to attract corpora-
tions to incorporate in Delaware.
53. The Hammer Court briefly addressed this concept by stating- 'There is no powek vested
in congress to require the States to exercise their police power so as to prevent possible unfair
competition." Hammer, 247 U.S. at 273.
54. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 40 (1937). The Court upheld a
law protecting employees from termination in retribution for union activity, even though these
activities were confined to a single state. See id. at 22.
55. See id. at 40. This test originated in Gibbons v. Ogden. Jones & Laughlin held that the
federal government could regulate commerce that extends to or affects other states. See id.
While Gibbons did not go so far as to extend the Commerce Clause to intrastate activities, Jones
& Laughlin directly confronted and approved regulation of intrastate activity with a tangential
effect on interstate commerce.
56. See BENSON, supra note 36, at 82. The dissent in Jones & Laughlin stated: "Whatever
effect any cause of discontent [among employees] may ultimately have upon commerce is far too
indirect to justify Congressional regulation. Almost anything-marriage, birth, death-may in
some fashion affect commerce." Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 99.
57. See BENSON, supra note 36, at 82. The court in Jones & Laughlin changed the focus of
the inquiry. "It is the effect upon commerce, not the source of the injury, which is the criterion."
Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 32. This test allows the federal government to regulate intrastate
activities. No longer would the Court look at which entity, the state or the federal government,
[Vol. 53:271280
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sidered in light of dual sovereignty to prevent destruction of the dis-
tinction between local and national powers. ' Yet nothing in the black
letter rule announced in Jones & Laughlin tempered its reach in order
to address the danger to federalism, making it easy to discard the
warning and use the sweeping standard by itself.
The Court demarcated the two distinct interpretations of the
Commerce Clause in United States v. Darby."' Using the transporta-
tion version of the Commerce Clause in the first half of its decision,
the Court upheld Congress's assertion of regulatory power over the
hours and wages of employees in local manufacturing activities.'
Congress had banned the interstate transportation of goods manufac-
tured under labor conditions in which wages and hours failed to con-
form to standards set by Congress."' Because this fit the transporta-
tion of "fill-in-the-blank" principle, it was constitutional." However,
the Court also applied the "substantial effects" principle in the second
half of the opinion to support the constitutionality of Congress's exer-
cise of the Commerce Clause power.' The inclusion of the two inter-
pretations of the Commerce Clause in the Darby opinion demonstrated
that the Court recognized both analytical models. Under Darby, the
national government may invoke the transportation principle not only
to regulate transportation of goods across state lines but also to reach
and set an underlying policy. After Darby, the national government
has control over the activity. As long as the activity had an effect on commerce, the federal gov-
ernment could regulate it.
58. See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37. The Court warned:
Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they
have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is es-
sential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress
cannot be denied the power to exercise that control. Undoubtedly the scope of [Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause] must be considered in the light of our dual system of
government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce
so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effec-
tually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a
completely centralized government.
Id.
59. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113-17 (1941).
60. See id. at 117-18.
61. See id. at 110.
62. See id. at 117 ('The obvious purpose of the Act was not only to prevent the interstate
transportation of the proscribed product, but to stop the initial step toward transportation, pro-
duction with the purpose of transporting it.").
63. See id. at 119-20 ("[Tlhis Court had many times held that the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce extends to the regulation through legislative action of activities
intrastate which have a substantial effect on the commerce or the exercise of the Congressional
power over it.").
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could either jump over the "transportation" hurdle or resort to the
substantial effects rationale.'
Just one year later, the Court swept aside the "transportation"
understanding of "interstate' to permit Congress to regulate all activi-
ties that have a substantial effect, taken in the aggregate, on inter-
state commerce.65 This broad rule allowed Congress to regulate the
consumption of homegrown wheat by a farmer.' The Court reasoned
that, while the consumption by one farmer of his own wheat was triv-
ial, all farmers' consumption of their own wheat had a substantial ef-
fect on interstate commerce. 7 Congress could now reach any individ-
ual activity, no matter how insignificant by itself, if the activity, when
aggregated nationally, created a substantial economic effect on inter-
state commerce.6 This test of "interstate" concentrates on the effect of
an activity on commerce, not which sovereign is best equipped to gov-
ern such behavior. Thus, if an activity has a substantial effect on
commerce, the national government may legislate, despite the fact
that such regulation usurps the traditional police power of the state.
In a fair and real sense, the Court's approval of national control over
purely local behavior eliminated the "interstate" aspects of the "inter-
state commerce" clause.
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Beyond
Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 196469 prompted both a chal-
lenge to and an expansion of the Commerce Clause power. A long-
heralded and noble piece of legislation, it spawned intense pressure on
64. Two federal statutes on automobiles illustrate Congress's ability to use the transporta-
tion principle to regulate local matters. See Kathleen F. Brickey, The Commerce Clause and
Federalized Crime: A Tale of Two Thieves, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 27, 29-30
(1996). In the early part of the twentieth century, car thieves would leave the state of the crime
to avoid state prosecution. See id. The federal government stepped in with a federal law that
criminalized such border-crossing behavior, a criminal statute predicated on the "transportation
across state lines" version of the Commerce Clause. See id. In the last part of the twentieth
century, a car thief confronted a different federal statute. See id. This one criminalized the
stealing of a car even if the thief never left the state. See id. It relied on the notion that, because
the thief stole something that had been in transported in interstate commerce, the thiefs act-
still criminal under state law-was subject to national regulation. See id. Congress thus used
the transportation version of the Commerce Clause to legislate local concerns.
65. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 127-28 ('That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be
trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here,
his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated is far from trivial.').
68. See BENSON, supra note 36, at 100.
69. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
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the Court70 to find the law constitutional.' Katzenbach v. McClung
(Ollie's Barbecue) held a federal law regulating the seating policy of a
local restaurant a constitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce
Clause power.' The Court found the discriminatory activity affected
interstate commerce in three ways: (1) it could impede interstate
travel by minorities; (2) it could create reluctance among new busi-
nesses to locate in the area; and (3) it could reduce the amount of
goods moving between states because it limits the market for out-of-
state products to white customers.' The Court reasoned that the act
of serving food that had traveled in interstate commerce subjected the
restaurant to federal regulation of its seating policy."' This decision
opened the door for Congress to regulate any aspect of local activity
that had a remote-even hypothetical--connection to interstate com-
merce.
75
For the next thirty-one years, Congress enjoyed the Supreme
Court's broad proclamation of Commerce Clause power. Congress
used its power to enact thousands of laws. One area Congress found
especially attractive was crime. Two centuries ago, only seventeen
acts were subject to national criminal sanctions. Today, there are
more than 3000 federal crimes." No limitation on the Commerce
70. See BENSON, supra note 36, at 221. Benson notes that "the Court could not possibly
have invalidated the statute without at the same time repudiating everything it had done over
the last quarter of a century." Id.
71. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief- The Federalization of American Criminal
Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1141 (1995). "However noble [Congress's] purpose, then, the civil
rights acts indelibly altered the role of federal criminal jurisdiction and signaled the coming
presence of a national police power." Id. But see BENSON, supra note 36, at 224 (noting that
"[t]he powers of the states are in no way reduced or impaired).
72. Katzenbach v. McClung (Ollie's Barbeque), 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964). Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States first tested the constitutionality of the power to enact the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964). Unlike Ollie's Bar-
beque, an argument can be made, however strained, that the proscribed activity in Heart of At-
lanta had an effect on interstate commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel served travelers on a
nearby interstate highway. See id. Racial discrimination could have affected the flow of people
and commerce into and through that area. See id. The connection between interstate commerce
and the proscribed activity in Ollie's Barbeque was more tenuous. The restaurant bought food
from a local provider who bought it from out of state suppliers. Ollie's Barbeque, 379 U.S. at 300-
01.
73. See Ollie's Barbeque, 379 U.S. at 299-302; see also BENSON, supra note 36, at 218.
74. See Ollie's Barbeque, 379 U.S. at 303-04. The Court did not require any evidence con-
necting discriminatory restaurant service with the flow of food in interstate commerce.
75. The Court held that "[t]he power of Congress in this field is broad and sweeping; where
it keeps within its sphere and violates no express constitutional limitation it has been the rules
of this Court, going back almost to the founding days of the Republic, not to interfere." Ollie's
Barbeque, 379 U.S. at 305; see also BENSON, supra note 36, at 224 (placing responsibility on
Congress to prevent a runaway commerce power).
76. See Brickey, supra note 64, at 28.
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Clause power appeared in the case law to prevent the expansive na-
tionalization of criminal law.
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Lopez,
and for the first time since the tense civil rights era, appeared to limit
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.7 The Court identified
three broad categories of constitutional use of Commerce Clause
power: (1) Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce; (2) Congress may regulate and protect the instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate com-
merce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activi-
ties; and (3) Congress's commerce authority includes the power to
regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce.
78
The three-part Lopez test actually combined prior versions of
Commerce Clause analysis. The first two constitutional exercises of
the Commerce Clause named in Lopez relate back to the "transporta-
tion" principle. The last corresponds directly to the "substantial ef-
fects" version. The law challenged in Lopez, the Gun-Free School
Zones Act,7" relied on the third category, the substantial effects ver-
sion.' Startling many legal scholars,"' the Court held the law invalid
under that test.' It signaled to Congress that not every activity would
automatically be deemed to affect commerce.' The Court quoted the
warning issued in Jones & Laughlin about the substantial effects test
and admitted that it had failed to heed that warning. ' At the end of
the decision, the majority indicated that the Court had taken great
steps in recent years towards eliminating the distinction between local
and national power.' With a "buck stops here' attitude, the Court
declared that it would go no further.'
77. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
78. See id.
79. Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. 1999).
80. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
81. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez, 46
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 839-40 (1996), who wrote:
The real significance of Lopez may be its symbolic value. The Gun-Free School Zones
Act federalized a local crime. It was part of a burgeoning body of federal criminal law,
much of which overlaps with or merely duplicates state crimes, Notably, the unre-
strained expansion of this body of law has occurred without regard for its effect on the
federal courts.
82. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
83. See id. at 558. The "proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity
'substantially affects' interstate commerce" (instead of "merely affects). Id. at 559.
84. See id. at 557. In heeding that warning, Lopezs substantial relationship requirement,
as opposed to mere relationship, attempts to give substance to the meaning of "interstate."
85. See id. at 567-68. The Court observed.
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Justice Thomas concurred in the result, but looked to the "text,
structure, and history of the commerce clause' for support.' He urged
that the substantial effects test runs contrary to the text of the Consti-
tution." If Congress can regulate everything that substantially affects
commerce, then "much if not all of Art. I, § 8... would be surplus-
age."' After discussing the original understanding of early case law
on the Commerce Clause, Justice Thomas recommended that the
Court adopt a new test.' The repercussion of not adopting a test more
in line with the Constitution, he warned, is to grant the national gov-
ernment a police power.
Ultimately, the Lopez decision did not explicitly overrule any
Commerce Clause precedent.' This left the legal community and the
courts wondering how to apply the decision to future cases. 2 It left
scholars wondering whether the three-part standard set out in the
opinion successfully commits the Court to the distinction between
what is "truly national and what is truly local."'" To answer this ques-
tion, this Note turns to the problems with the current approach.
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon in-
ference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admit-
tedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving great defer-
ence to congressional action. The broad language in these opinions has suggested the
possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so
would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not pre-
suppose something not enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local. This we are unwilling to do.
Id. (citations omitted).
86. See id. at 567-68.
87 Id. at 585.
88. See id. at 587-89.
89. Id. at 589 (citing the authority to coin money and regulate its value, to pass uniform
bankruptcy laws, to provide for the punishment of counterfeiters, to establish a postal service,
and to confer patents and copyrights).
90. See id. at 602. Justice Thomas reviewed the original meaning and jurisprudence of the
Commerce Clause. He concluded that eventually "we must modify our Commerce Clause juris-
prudence ... [but in this case] it is easy enough to say that the Clause certainly does not em-
power Congress to ban gun possession within 1,000 feet of a school." Id.
91. See Brickey, supra note 64, at 37. The concurrence of Justice Kennedy emphasized that
in no way did Lopez question the validity of key Commerce Clause precedent, such as Heart of
Atlanta Motel and Ollie's Barbeque. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68; Brickey, supra note 81, at
839-40.
92. See Brickey, supra note 64, at 37.
93. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
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III. RECOGNIZING THE PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH
The dangers of an expansive interpretation of the Commerce
Clause, which include an overburdened federal court system and the
destruction of dual sovereignty, can be avoided by shifting the under-
standing of the Commerce Clause towards a functional interpretation.
A. The Court
The federal court system is at or beyond its capacity in the
wake of the nationalization of criminal law. In several of his year end
reports to the judiciary, Chief Justice Rehnquist cautioned that the
federal courts are not an unlimited resource and a crisis will result if
nothing checks the growth of federal crimes.' Thirty criminal justice
organizations criticized the nationalization of state crimes." The Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General and the National Conference
of State Legislatures pleaded with Congress to recognize that the
states, not the national government, bear responsibility for criminal
law enforcement."
The proliferation of national criminal cases has clogged federal
court dockets.97 While caseloads increase, the Speedy Trial Act9 re-
94. See Brickey, supra note 81, at 840. Chief Justice Rehnquist warned that "we can no
longer afford the luxury of state and federal courts that work at cross-purposes or irrationally
duplicate one another." Brickey, supra note 71, at 1168.
95. See Brickey, supra note 81, at 842.
96. See Brickey, supra note 64, at 38.
97. See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts,
543 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCi. 39, 45-46 (1996). The number of federal criminal cases
grew by 70 percent from 1980 to 1992. See id. Criminal cases today consume a disproportionate
and unprecedented share of federal judicial resources. See id. While criminal cases occupy 17
percent of the federal docket, 38 of the 92 federal court districts devote more than 50 percent of
their trial dockets to criminal cases. See id.; see also Andrew Weis, Commerce Clause in the
Cross-Hairs: The Use of Lopez-Based Motions to Challenge the Constitutionality of Federal
Criminal Statutes, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1439 (1996). But see Harry Litman and Mark D.
Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of
Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 921, 963 (1997), who wrote:
[T]he act and other recent legislation in traditionally state areas do not supplant state
criminal legislation and bring vast numbers of local crimes into federal court. Rather, the
legislation merely creates concurrent federal jurisdiction, making federal prosecutions
possible in select cases where the need for a federal response is difficult to deny. Both by
design and in practice, federal prosecutions occur in only a tiny fraction of the cases cov-
ered by the federal criminal legislation.
Litman and Greenberg's analysis notably does not include drug cases, which constitute a large
portion of federal criminal adjudications. See Brickey, supra note 71, at 1168-69.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1994 & Supp. 1999). The Speedy Trial Act provides that "the trial of a
defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall com-
mence within seventy days" of indictment or first appearance. Id. § 3161(c)(1).
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quires federal courts to adjudicate criminal cases before civil actions."
The strain on the federal prisons serves as an indicator of the rapid
nationalization of criminal law. The federal prison population more
than doubled between 1980 and 1990."w Between 1990 and 1995, it
almost doubled again." ' In addition to the federal courts and prisons,
federal prosecutors and federal police agencies feel the overwhelming
burden of the nationalization of criminal law.
10 2
Even if one does not think that the overwhelming burden of na-
tionalized crime justifies, on policy grounds, a restricted Commerce
Clause interpretation, institutional integrity supports a change in the
status quo. The Lopez standard provides inadequate guidance to
lower courts in their application of the Commerce Clause. To ensure a
cohesive and reliable interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the Su-
preme Court should clarify what precedent and principles remain
valid tools of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Since the Court handed down Lopez in 1995, the federal ap-
pellate courts have been hesitant to strike down a federal statute for
overstepping Commerce Clause power.0 3 Meanwhile, courts approved
several federal statutes. For example, appellate courts upheld stat-
utes relating to car jacking,' blocking entrances to abortion clinics,'"
committing violence against women,'"' possession of firearms by
felons,' and manufacturing marijuana." In the words of one court,
"courts have resisted urgings to extend Lopez beyond [the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 19901."'' Few courts have cited Lopez to reverse a
99. See Weis, supra note 97, at 1439.
100. See Brickey, supra note 71, at 1157-58.
101. See id.
102. See Beale, supra note 97, at 45-46. The budget of federal prosecutors (The Criminal Di-
vision in the Department of Justice and The United States Attorney's Office) has increased dra-
matically since the 1970s. See id. The number of federal prosecutors has swelled from approxi-
mately 3,000 in the mid-1970s to more than 8,000 in the 1990s. See id. More than fifty major
federal agencies play a role in enforcing federal criminal laws. See id.
103. See Lisanne Newell Leasure, Commerce Clause Challenges Spawned by United States v.
Lopez are Doing Violence to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA): A Survey of Cases and the
Ongoing Debate over how the VAWA will Fare in the Wake of Lopez, 50 ME. L. REV. 410, 442
(1998).
104. See, e.g., United States v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Hutchinson, 75 F.3d 626, 627 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569,
590 (3d Cir. 1995).
105. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 588 (4th Cir. 1997); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d
1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995).
106. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 132 F.3d 949, 974 (4th Cir. 1997), va-
cated on reh'g en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom., United States v.
Morrison, 68 U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S. Sept 28, 1999) (No. 99-5).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 1996).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1112 (4th Cir. 1995).
109. United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1448 (6th Cir. 1996).
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conviction."' In March of 1999, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc,
reversed a panel decision and became the first appellate court to fol-
low Lopez and heed the Jones & Laughlin warning by striking down
the Violence Against Women Act."' Nevertheless, the persistent re-
luctance of federal courts to use Lopez to overturn Congressional acts
indicates the need for clarification by the Supreme Court.
B. The States
Lopez announced that the "[s]tates possess primary authority
for defining and enforcing the criminal law... [and] [w]hen Congress
criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal by the States, it
effects a 'change in the sensitive relation between federal and state
criminal jurisdiction."' , The change destroys the positive aspects of
federalism. The Constitution no longer checks the potentially sweep-
ing power of the national government."' Under dual sovereignty, state
governments may experiment with solutions to problems, making
them laboratories of democracy."' When a particular state, through
trial and error, devises the optimal solution to a problem of national
import, other states may copy it. Allowing the national government to
implement a single solution typically means that no experimentation
to determine the best solution occurs. Instead of having fifty experi-
ments, the nation must hope that the one solution chosen by the na-
tional government succeeds.'15
The argument that local action is better than national action is
far from new. When he visited America, Alexis de Tocqueville pro-
claimed that local action was better than centralized action because it
created "an all-pervading and restless activity, a superabundant force,
and an energy which is inseparable from it, and which may, however
unfavorable circumstances may be, produce wonders. These are the
true advantages of democracy.' ... This energy force de Tocqueville re-fers to comes from the "awareness of one's neighbor ... rather than
110. See, e.g., United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating
that federal jurisdiction under the federal arson act could not be conferred based on the use of
out of state natural gas); United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1363-65 (D. Ariz. 1995)
(holding a federal statute that punished the failure to pay child support unconstitutional).
111. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub
nom., United States v. Morrison, 68 U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S. Sept 28, 1999) (No. 99-5).
112. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (citations omitted); see also
Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791, 807 (W.D.N.C. 1996).
113. See Weis, supra note 97, at 1439.
114. See id. at 1440.
115. See Bauerle, supra note 10, at 112-13.
116. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 110 (Richard D. Heffner ed., 1984).
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some theoretical knowledge of the needs of other people which guides
action..... The physical proximity that state governments have to the
people make them more likely to know the needs and wants of their
citizens. The central government in Washington, D.C., must regulate
for everyone in the country, while state governments can concentrate
on the particular needs of their own citizens. The national govern-
ment runs the risk of satisfying no one by trying to please everyone. A
single state avoids such inefficiency by confining its focus within state
boundaries.
C. The Solution
Functional analysis provides a solution to the problems out-
lined above that reaps the benefits of local action without denying the
occasional utility of national action. Functional analysis focuses on
the Commerce Clause's purpose in the federal system by asking the
question: "Which body of government within our Constitutional struc-
ture should regulate" Congress should only exercise its power under
the Commerce Clause when necessary to maintain or respond to the
integrated national economy. This will occur only when the states
cannot effectively regulate by themselves."8
What is functional analysis? Functional analysis is a practical
approach to law. It takes a step back from the problem itself and asks
what roles the state and national governments should play in the con-
stitutional system. The Constitution created two governments, strik-
ing a careful and certain balance between the enumerated powers of
the national government and the reserved powers of the states. The
current Commerce Clause jurisprudence creates a system in which the
functions of the state and national governments effectively merge, al-
most to the point where they are performing the same tasks. The
Framers created a system in which the states regulate almost every-
thing, and restricted the scope of national authority to the specific ar-
eas enumerated in Article I, Section 8. Yet, through the twentieth-
century expansion of the interstate commerce power, the national gov-
ernment now regulates almost anything it wants. Functional analysis
117. F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 258 (1994).
118. Several authors have argued that the court should use functional analysis to determine
the meaning of the Commerce Clause. See Merritt, supra note 21, at 1211; Donald H. Regan,
How to Think about the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v.
Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 594 (1995). Merritt argues that the commerce power should extend
to things that the state cannot do itself. See Merritt, supra note 21, at 1213. She does not add
that we should adopt this policy because of an integrated national economy. The theory this
Note introduces asks both who should regulate and why they should regulate. Neither of these
articles advocates both principles.
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crafts a workable doctrine that will prevent this usurpation of state
power.
Functional analysis asks whether the states can handle the
problem by themselves, or whether the national government needs to
step in to serve the needs or counteract the influence of an integrated
national economy. Current Commerce Clause jurisprudence incor-
rectly ignores this functional inquiry. Functional analysis helps sort
out issues that actually need national attention from ones used to
make Congress look responsive to public sentiments."1 Politics will
always play a role in legislation, but by asking whether Congress is
the proper regulatory body, functional analysis minimizes the nega-
tive effects of politics on the dual sovereignty system.
Asking whether the states can legislate on their own changes
the direction of the courts' analysis of Commerce Clause challenges.
Instead of asking how much out-of-state beef Ollie's Barbecue buys
each month or whether violence against women affects the national
economy, it directs a court to ask which body can best solve the un-
derlying problem and best serve the legislative objective. The ques-
tions are more probative than thoughtlessly connecting the dots from
the targeted activity to its effects on interstate commerce. Functional
analysis reaches and serves the heart of federalism, a central concern
of the Framers, the Constitution, and its early critics.
While it calls for an ad hoc, fact-intensive judgment in each
case, the guidance functional analysis provides is key to creating a
cohesive, principled Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In a sense,
functional analysis turns the current question around and searches for
cases in which interstate commerce has a substantial effect on the
regulation. It preserves federalism by recognizing that when individ-
ual states satisfying the needs of their own citizens frustrate the abil-
ity of other states to act, national legislation is appropriate.
In interpreting "interstate commerce," functional analysis con-
siders the objective of fostering an integrated national economy and
seeks meaning in both terms. Lopez suggested that Congress's com-
merce power did not include power over non-economic activity, or, if it
implicated non-economic activity, the Congressional act deserved
heightened review.20 The Lopez Court's statement on non-economic
119. For example, by enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act, Congress could appear tough
on crime to constituents. The law arguably had no other value because states already had simi-
lar laws. See Merritt, supra note 21, at 1214. Similarly, the VAWA creates a national law pun-
ishing violence against women, seemingly already served by state rape, assault, and domestic
violence statutes.
120. See Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
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activity hints that the proper interpretation of the Commerce Clause
might not cover non-economic activity at all. The inclusion of only
economic activity-notably, broader in scope than commercial activ-
ity-in the definition of interstate commerce focuses the Court's
Commerce Clause interpretation on the national economic aspects of a
congressional act. By giving content to the notion of "commerce," it
supplies a limiting factor to the definition of the Commerce Clause.
Without these text- and purpose-based restrictions, the words "inter-
state commerce" have no boundaries, and Congress can regulate al-
most anything. It can govern purely local wheat consumption, as in
Wickard; non-commercial labor relations, as in Jones & Laughlin and
Darby; or it can expand on both fronts and capture non-commercial
discrimination by purely local barbecue bigots in Ollie's Barbecue.
Apparently conceding the substantive value of "interstate,"
some scholars assert that the Court should not define commerce as
requiring an economic component, and instead use the Commerce
Clause to allow Congress to legislate any issue of national concern."
One commentator argues:
I could explain to my ten-year-old son that the Constitution permits Congress to pro-
hibit racial discrimination because racism anywhere in the country undermines the
dignity of all citizens. But my son would think I was joking if I suggested that the Con-
stitution allows Congress to prohibit race discrimination because those acts occur in
settings in which people purchase goods from other states. Yet the latter explanation is
exactly what the Supreme Court would have him believe.12
This argument appears to assume the desirability of creating national
regulations on race discrimination under the Commerce Clause
authority."n Yet good causes are not always within the scope of con-
121. See Merritt, supra note 21, at 1216.
122. See id.
123. The Commerce Clause may not provide the power to regulate racial discrimination.
Fortunately, national regulation may be supported by other parts of the Constitution, such as
the Thirteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment states:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend XIII. An argument can be made that racial discrimination results from and
remains one of the badges and incidents of slavery. Thus, Congress has the power to prevent
such racial discrimination. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See generally
Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1995)
(urging a resurrection of the Thirteenth Amendment to enable Congress to legislate against
inequality); Charles H. Jones, Jr., An Argument for Federal Protection Against Racially Moti-
vated Crimes: 18 U.S.C. § 241 and the Thirteenth Amendment, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 689
(1986). While this argument may work for black-white racial discrimination, other types of dis-
crimination (e.g., gender) could not be regulated under the Thirteenth Amendment, as it applies
only to slavery. But see Marcellene Elizabeth Hearn, A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of the
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gressional authority. The economic nature of the Commerce Clause is
clear from the ordinary meaning of "commerce,"'" the Framers' intent,
and judicial interpretation up until the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1'
The appeal of legislating good causes, such as racial discrimi-
nation and certain forms of crime, has occasionally forced the Court
and Congress to find some power in the Constitution, usually the
Commerce Clause, to sanction national legislation. An economic limi-
tation on the Commerce Clause hinders such legislation. The re-
quirement that regulated behavior threaten or otherwise bear a sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce similarly circumscribes the
breadth of national legislation.
Unfortunately, in the past, courts have minimized these fac-
tors' importance, often jumping clear over the "interstate" and "com-
merce" hurdles. Race discrimination, guns in schools, and violence
against women are all bad things, but national legislation addressing
these issues manipulates the Constitution, casting aside the Framers'
intent and the dual-sovereign structure to accomplish unnecessary
national uniformity on politically fashionable subjects. The allure of
legislation on good causes should not justify manipulation of the Con-
stitution. The states can legislate on these good causes just as well as
or better than the national government. The Court's interpretation of
an invigorated Commerce Clause might give them that chance.
IV. A TALE OF TWO CASES
In the last year, two cases signaled the possible legacy of Lopez,
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute' and United States v. Wil-
Violence Against Women Act, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1144-45 (arguing that violence against
women constitutes involuntary servitude, thus Congress had the power to enact the VAWA).
124. Black's Law Dictionary defines commerce as "[tihe exchange of goods, productions, or
property of any kind; the buying, selling, and exchanging of articles [or tihe transportation of
persons and property by land, water, and, air." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 269 (6th ed. 1990).
125. See supra Part II. In the cases up until Ollie's Barbeque, an argument could be made
that state regulation of racial discrimination would interfere with the integrated national econ-
omy. On the other hand, it was impossible to make the argument that national regulation of
racial discrimination was needed in order to maintain an integrated national economy or that the
national economy prevented such regulation. The national government regulated racial dis-
crimination for moral reasons that some states refused to recognize. While moral reasons are
good reasons, they cannot be a constitutional basis for otherwise unconstitutional national leg-
islation.
126. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 132 F.3d 949, 953 (4th Cir. 1997), opinion va-
cated on reh'g en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. United States v.
Morrison, 68 U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1999) (No. 99-5).
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son.12 7  The cases addressed the constitutionality of the Violence
Against Women Act" and the Clean Water Act, respectively.' The
cases share a common thread: a challenge to Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause. The timeliness of the cases provides an oppor-
tunity to test not only the applicability of Lopez but also the possible
use of functional analysis in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
A. The Story-Take One
Christy Brzonkala entered Virginia Polytechnic Institute as a
first year student in the fall of 1994.1 On the evening of Septem-
ber 21, 1994, she and another female student met two men, later iden-
tified as Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, whom Christy only
knew by their first names and their status as football players.131 The
four students gathered in the dormitory where Christy lived. They
chatted for fifteen minutes, and then Christy's friend and Crawford
left the room.13 Morrison immediately turned to Christy and asked if
she would have sexual intercourse with him.'33 She twice told Morri-
son, "No.""' The verbal refusals did not deter Morrison. Christy got
up to leave the room, and Morrison grabbed her and threw her on the
bed. "'35 He pushed her down by the shoulders and tore off her clothes."
He turned off the lights and then used his arms and legs to hold her
down. She struggled to get away, without success. 7 Morrison forcibly
raped her without using a condom."' Before Christy could get away,
Crawford returned to the room and raped Christy by holding her down
with his arms and knees.'39 After Crawford was finished, Morrison
raped Christy for a second time.""
127. Unites States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
128. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat.1902 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
129. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) codified in
scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
130. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 953.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
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After he was done, Morrison warned Christy that she "better
not have any fucking diseases...... In the months following the rape,
Christy became depressed and avoided contact with her friends and
classmates. She cut off her long hair, stopped attending classes, and
eventually attempted suicide."' She later withdrew from the univer-
sity. Morrison publicly announced in the dormitory cafeteria that he
"Iike[d] to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them.'.'
Christy filed a complaint with the university in April, 1995."
After imposing a two-semester suspension against Morrison, the uni-
versity judiciary committee allowed Morrison to return, reversing its
original decision. "5 Christy filed suit against the university in federal
court, alleging a violation of Title III of the VAWA and raising some
state law claims against Morrison and Crawford."' The district court
held Title III unconstitutional as overstepping the bounds of the
Commerce Clause power and the Fourteenth Amendment."7
Brzonkala appealed and a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit
overturned the decision.' s On rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit
vacated the panel decision and reinstated the trial court's ruling.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on this case to determine the
constitutionality of Title III of the VAWA."
The Fourth Circuit relied on Lopez to hold the VAWA an un-
constitutional exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 935 F. Supp. 779, 782 (W.D. Va. 1996), cert.
granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 68 U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S. Sept 28, 1999) (No. 99-5).
145. See id. On appeal, the committee found insufficient evidence to convict Crawford. See
id. After several appeals, the university provost deferred Morrison's two year suspension until
Morrison's graduation from the university, and required him to attend a one-year educational
session regarding the university's policies on acceptable standards of student conduct. See
Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 955.
146. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 956. Title Em[ of the VAWA is a civil rights provision creating
"a positive statutory right for all individuals to be free from gender motivated violence." Lees-
ure, supra note 103, at 410-411.
147. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 793.
148. See Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 953.
149. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 821 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted sub nom., United States v. Morrison, 68 U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S. Sept 28, 1999) (No. 99-5).
This Note only addresses whether Congress constitutionally exercised its power under the Com-
merce Clause in passing Title I of the VAWA. The court also considered whether Title M was
a constitutional exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
id. at 862. On this issue, the Court ruled that "Congress may not regulate purely private con-
duct pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power." Id.
150. United States v. Morrison, 68 U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S. Sept 28, 1999) (No. 99-5).
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Clause.51 The court noted that the substantial effects prong of the
three-part Lopez standard cannot uphold regulation of a non-economic
activity."5 2 The court stated that, even if the requirement of economic
activity or a jurisdictional element served only as the "presumptive
outer limits," and not the absolute extreme of what the Supreme Court
would approve, the statute would still not survive a constitutional
challenge." The court hypothesized that the absolute limit of Com-
merce Clause power would be a holding that Congress could regulate
non-economic activities if they bore a direct and distinct relationship
to interstate commerce."M Assuming that marks the outer limit, the
court found an "attenuated and indirect relationship with interstate
commerce!' in the VAWA and remarked that holding the Act within
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause would "do what the Su-
preme Court has never done.''1
B. The Story-Take Two
James J. Wilson, a land developer with over thirty years expe-
rience, served as the chief executive officer and chairman of the board
of directors for Interstate General, a publicly traded land development
company.'" Interstate General was a general partner in St. Charles
Associates, which owned land under development in the planned
community of St. Charles. Its prized piece of real estate lay between
the Potomac River and the Chesapeake Bay in Charles County,
Maryland. 7 In 1997, St. Charles consisted of 4,000 developed acres
and 10,000 housing units with 33,000 residents. When finished, it
was to be a 9,100 acre planned community of some 80,000 residents.'
The community was formed under the New Communities Act of 1968
151. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 833. ("[I]t cannot be sustained on the authority of Lopez, nor
any of the Court's previous Commerce Clause holdings, as a constitutional exercise of Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce.!).
152. See id. at 831. The court decided that the distinction between economic and non-
economic regulations is of "critical importance" to the Lopez analysis. Id. at 832 n.5. However, it
stated that a jurisdictional element could save the statute. See id. at 831. The VAWA does not
have a jurisdictional element. See id. at 836. A jurisdictional element requires the Court to
adjudicate whether the act regulated by Congress affects interstate commerce in each case. The
result cannot be presumed from precedent. See id.
153. See id. at 837.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 844. Applying the Lopez analysis to the facts before it, the court remarked that it
would "pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States." See id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995)).
156. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1997).
157. See id.
158. See id.
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and initially developed as a joint project of Interstate General and the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development."9
At issue in the trial were four parcels of land located more than
ten miles from the Chesapeake Bay, more than six miles from the Po-
tomac River and hundreds of yards away from the nearest stream."
With the parcels not ready for construction, Wilson attempted to use a
type of excavation known as "sidecasting" to drain water from these
parcels and dump fill material on the land. 6' Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act required developers to obtain a permit from the Army
Corps of Engineers for such activity.6 '
The Clean Water Act prohibits discharges of pollutants into
"navigable waters,"'1' which it defines as "waters of the United
States."" The Army Corps of Engineers, in turn, defines "waters of
the United States" as: (1) interstate wetlands;6 ' (2) wetlands adjacent
to other waters of the United States (adjacent wetlands);" and (3) in-
trastate, non-adjacent waters (isolated wetlands).' 7 The areas filled at
James Wilson's direction were inland, isolated areas that fell within
the Corps' regulation defining waters of the United States to include
those waters whose "degradation... could affect!' interstate com-
159. See id.
160. See id. at 257.
161. See id. at 254-55.
162. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994). The § 404 program requires permits in connection with the
discharge of "dredged" or "fill" material into "navigable waters." § 1344(a). Congress delegated
to the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") authority to administer the program. See 33 C.F.R. §
323 (1998). The Corps' regulations define "dredged material" as "material that is excavated or
dredged from waters of the United States." § 323.2(c). "Fill material" is defined as "any material
used for the primary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bot-
tom elevation of an [sic] waterbody." § 323.2(e). The Clean Water Act holds a person liable if he
or she engages in these activities without a § 404 permit. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The permit
program is one of the most important and controversial portions of the Clean Water Act. See
Oliver A. Houck, Clean Water Act and Related Programs, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 241 (A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 1997). Houck states that "Section 404 has been the most controversial provision in the
Act and, the case could be made of all environmental law. It pits the nation's most productive
and threatened ecosystems against its most cherished notions of private property develop-
ment... several thousands times per year." Id. at 244. See also Matthew L. Pirnot, United
States v. Wilson: Did Interstate General Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce?, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 361, 371 (1998).
163. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12).
164. Id. § 1362(7).
165. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(2) (1998); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(2).
166. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(7); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7).
167. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
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merce.' The United States charged James Wilson and Interstate
General with criminal violations of the Clean Water Act. 69
At trial, the government introduced evidence that all four of
the parcels contained wetlands'0 and that the defendants failed to ob-
tain permits from the Corps to drain the land and fill it with dirt.'' To
prove that the parcels fell within the authority of the Corps to regu-
late, the government introduced substantial evidence about the physi-
cal characteristics that identified them as wetlands.' The govern-
ment showed that the water from these parcels flowed in a drainage
pattern ultimately joining the Potomac River, which drains into the
Chesapeake Bay.'73 This proof was necessary to meet the Corps' defi-
nition of waters whose degradation could affect interstate commerce.'
The defendants introduced evidence contradicting the Corps'
assertion that the parcels constituted wetlands. "5 They showed that
the Corps' enforcement was inconsistent in that it took action on only
one parcel despite awareness of ongoing development on all four par-
cels. 6 An internal Corps memorandum that stated that, while the
areas in the St. Charles development have the "necessary parame-
ters.., to be considered wetlands when using the Corps Wetland
Manual,... it is not clear.., that these areas can be interpreted as
'waters of the United States' within the meaning or purview of Section
404..1. Despite this defense, the jury convicted all defendants on four
felony counts."'8 The court sentenced Wilson to twenty-one months
imprisonment and one year supervised release and fined him $1 mil-
lion.' 9 Interstate General and St. Charles Associates were fined $3
million and placed on five years probation.'" The court also ordered
168. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1997); see also 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a)(3).
169. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 253.
170. The National Research Council defines "wetland" as "an ecosystem that depends on con-
stant or recurrent, shallow inundation or saturation at or near the surface of the substrate. The
minimum essential characteristics of a wetland are recurrent, sustained inundation or satura-
tion. Common diagnostic features of wetlands are hydric soils and hydrophytic vegetation."
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, WETLANDS: CHARACTERISTICS AND BOUNDARIES 3 (1995).
171. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 254.
172. See id. at 254-55. The evidence included "testimonial and photographic evidence of sig-
nificant standing water, reports of vegetation typical to hydrologic soils, and infrared aerial
photographs showing a pattern of stream courses visible under the vegetation." Id. at 254.
173. See id. at 254-55.
174. See id. at 255-56; see also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (a)(3) (1998).
175. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 255.
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 254.
180. See id.
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the defendants to implement a wetlands restoration and mitigation
plan proposed by the government."'
The defendants appealed, and the Fourth Circuit held that the
Corps exceeded its congressional authorization in promulgating regu-
lations under the Clean Water Act because its regulations extended
the jurisdiction of the Act beyond the scope of the commerce power."
The Court did not declare the statute unconstitutional but stated in
dicta:
Were this regulation a statute, duly enacted by Congress, it would present serious con-
stitutional difficulties, because, at least at first blush, it would appear to exceed con-
gressional authority under the Commerce Clause. Absent a clear indication to the con-
trary, we should not lightly presume that merely by defining "navigable waters" as "the
waters of the United States," Congress authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to as-
sert its jurisdiction in such a sweeping and constitutionally troubling manner.183
This excessive use of the commerce power led the Fourth Circuit to
reverse the lower court decision and remand for a new trial."
C. The Tie That Binds
The Fourth Circuit invalidated both Title III of the Violence
Against Women Act and an agency's interpretation of the Clean Water
Act because those laws exceeded the scope of Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause. The right results, no doubt, but the decisions
do not clarify or suitably explain the application of United States v.
Lopez, and likely could not. As courts rely on this unstable law, they
must operate without a logical framework to decide whether a statute
builds on one inference too many or ties together too many strained
readings of "interstate" and "commerce."
181. See id.
182. See id. at 257. The unauthorized regulation was 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), which defines
"waters of the United States" to include: "All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams (including intermittent streams), mud flats, sand flats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie pot-
holes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which
could affect interstate or foreign commerce."
183. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257 (citation omitted).
184. See id. at 266. Including the Fourth Circuit decision in Wilson, three circuit courts have
examined the constitutionality of the Clean Water Act's regulation of "isolated wetlands." See
Leslie Salt. Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995); Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Adminis-
trator, United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992). The Seventh and
Ninth Circuits upheld the regulation, while the Fourth Circuit in Wilson invalidated it as an
unreasonable interpretation of the Clean Water Act. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257. Thus, a circuit
split has developed on the issue, which may prompt review by the Supreme Court. See David A.
Linehan, Endangered Regulation: Why the Commerce Clause May no Longer be Suitable Habitat
for Endangered Species and Wetlands Regulation, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 365, 386 (1998). The
Seventh and Ninth Circuit opinions were decided before Lopez and, while decided on Commerce
Clause grounds, do not address the Lopez approach.
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Before discussing the law, some non-legal observations must be
made. Christy Brzonkala's story is tragic. One cannot help but feel
that she needs and deserves as much legal protection as the nation
can muster. The story pulls at the heartstrings, and one wants to find
the VAWA constitutional because it serves an important purpose that
has extensive public support. The maxim that hard cases make bad
law does not even apply here because this could very well be an easy
case making bad law. On the other hand, the story of James Wilson is
much less dramatic. While he may have harmed the environment by
developing houses on wetlands, those facts do not have the same emo-
tional appeal as the story of Christy Brzonkala. One does not feel the
urge to punish him as one feels the urge to protect rape victims. The
lack of an emotional tug makes it easier to find this regulation uncon-
stitutional under the Commerce Clause without feeling tremendous
regret. Because the case lacked emotional appeal, Wilson was "largely
overlooked by the media."" One cannot ignore the emotional appeal
that a decision on violence against women invokes and the effect such
emotion may have on the outcome in the court system.
The emotional tugs of these cases should not control the legal
analysis. While VAWA is a noble cause, the Court should not follow
its decision in Ollie's Barbeque"' and allow a good cause to make bad
constitutional law. The standard established in United States v. Lopez
needs clarification from the Supreme Court.8 ' Hopefully, the grant of
certiorari in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute signals the
Court's desire to dispel that confusion and develop a basis for unemo-
tional, principled Commerce Clause decisionmaking.
1. The Constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act
The passage of the VAWA in 1994 prompted a flurry of scholar-
ship on its constitutionality under the Commerce Clause power, most
supporting the statute."' The media joined the coverage when the
185. Brigid McMenamin, Drawing a Line in the Sand, FORBES, Mar. 9, 1998, at 100.
186. Katzenbach v. McClung (Ollie's Barbeque), 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
187. The confusion is demonstrated by the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the VAWA. A three
judge panel upheld Title 1H as a constitutional exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause, but the en banc majority and the district court found it an unconstitutional step beyond
Congress's power, all applying Lopez. The opposite results of the reviewing courts indicate that
the standard in Lopez needs clarification from the Supreme Court. See also infra notes 188-203
and accompanying text.
188. See generally Peter J. Liuzzo, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University:
The Constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act-Recognizing that Violence Targeted
Against Women Affects Interstate Commerce, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 367 (1997); Kerrie E. Maloney,
Gender-Motivated Violence and the Commerce Clause: The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence
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Fourth Circuit en banc struck down the law and when the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in the fall of 1999."' The malleable Lopez
standard asks whether the VAWA constitutes one of the three permis-
sible uses of the Commerce Clause power." Functional analysis asks
whether Congress should regulate violence against women. Juxta-
posing the answers to these questions, in turn, shows that functional
analysis makes better sense of the Commerce Clause and illuminates
the disadvantages of Lopez.
a. VAWA Under Lopez
The Lopez standard"' examines the VAWA under the "substan-
tial effects" test, as the Act does not involve channels or instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce. The compelling interstate effects of
violence against women persuasively support the argument for the
constitutionality of the VAWA. Unlike the statute at issue in Lopez,
Congress extensively studied violence against women, relying on ex-
perts in the field."' This information allowed Congress to conclude
Against Women Act after Lopez, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1876 (1996); Charis Mincavage, Title Iff of
the Violence Against Women Act: Can it Survive a Commerce Clause Challenge in the Wake of
United States v. Lopez, 102 DICK. L. REV. 441 (1998); Karen Tichenor, The Violence Against
Women Act: Continued Confusion over the Scope of the Commerce Clause, 18 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 329 (1997); Megan Weinstein, The Violence Against Women Act after United States v. Lo-
pez: Defending the Act from Constitutional Challenge, 12 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 119 (1997);
Carolyn Peri Weiss, Title III of the Violence Against Women Act: Constitutionally Safe and
Sound, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (1997)
189. See Joan Biskupic, Dispute May Test Power of Congress: Court to Review Law on Gen-
der, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1999, at A3; Steve Chapman, Editorial, A Distorted View of Violence
Against Women, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1999, at C21; Tony Mauro, Court Will Review Laws of
Protection, Validity of Safeguards for Women, Clinics Challenged, USA TODAY, Sept. 29, 1999, at
4A; Jean McNair, Gender-Based Violence Law is Overturned, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24, 1999, at CN9;
Patt Morrison, The Law Grapples with Men Who Hate Women, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1999, at B1.
190. (1) Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) Congress
may regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities; and (3)
Congress's commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substan-
tial relation to interstate commerce. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
191. See supra notes 77-93 and accompanying text.
192. These experts revealed disturbing statistics. For example, violence is the leading cause
of injury to women ages 15-44, more common than automobile accidents, muggings, and cancer
deaths combined. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993) (citing Surgeon General Antonia
Novello, From the Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Services, 267 JAMA 3132, 3132 (1992)).
Every week during 1991, more than 2,000 women were raped and more than 90 women were
murdered. See id. Studies have reported that 50 percent of rape victims lose their jobs or are
forced to quit because of the crime's severity. See S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 37 (1993); see also
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 132 F.3d 949, 966 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated on reh'g en
banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom., United States v. Morrison, 68
U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S. Sept 28, 1999) (No. 99-5) ('Thus based upon exhaustive and meticulous
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that violence against women affects interstate commerce.193 Thus, if
the court uses a rational basis test to review the statute, the height-
ened fact-finding performed by Congress will permit the Court to re-
gard the statute as a constitutional exercise of Commerce Clause
power."" The Supreme Court has long permitted Congress to promote
civil rights using its Commerce Clause power, as long as it had a ra-
tional basis for regarding the legislation as within its power.'99 This
history of constitutional exercises of the Commerce Clause power to
attack discrimination creates an impressive array of precedent to rely
upon in defending the Act.
Yet the same Lopez standard also offers persuasive arguments
for invalidating the VAWA. First, Lopez created a distinction between
economic and non-economic activity, limiting Congress to the former.'"
The VAWA regulates non-economic activity9 . in that it nationalizes
the law of violent crimes motivated by gender.'99 Congress's fact-
findings show that violence against women impedes their performance
in the workplace, which in turn affects and harms interstate com-
merce.'" Such evidence, however, seems "to pile inference upon infer-
investigation of the problem, Congress found that 'crimes of violence motivated by gender have a
substantial and adverse effect on interstate commerce.'" (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711,
at 385 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839, 1853)).
193. See Lori L. Schick, Comment, Breaking the "Rule of Thumb" and Opening the Cur-
tains-Can the Violence Against Women Act Survive Constitutional Scrutiny?, 28 U. TOL. L. REV.
887, 915 (1997).
194. See Mincavage, supra note 188, at 463.
195. See Katzenbach v. McClung (Ollie's Barbeque), 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964); Liuzzo, supra
note 188, at 390; see also Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 966 ("[A] 'court must defer' to congressional
findings when there is a 'rational basis for such a finding.'" (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981))).
196. The limit is established by inference from both the majority opinion and Justice Ken-
nedy's concurrence, which stressed that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was neither interstate
economic activity nor part of a 'larger regulation of economic activity." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561;
id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d
820, 833 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom., United States v. Morrison, 68 U.S.L.W. 3177
(U.S. Sept 28, 1999) (No. 99-5) ("[The VAWA] neither regulates an economic activity nor contains
a jurisdictional element. Accordingly, it cannot be sustained on the authority of Lopez, nor any
of the Court's previous Commerce Clause holdings, as a constitutional exercise of Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce."). But see Liuzzo, supra note 188, at 387-88 (arguing
that the court did not set down a rule to be used in distinguishing economic from non-economic
activities).
197. See Melinda M. Renshaw, Choosing Between Principles of Federal Power: The Civil
Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 47 EMORY L.J. 819, 841-42 (1998). But see
Weinstein, supra note 188, at 124 (arguing that the statute does regulate economic activity be-
cause of the "significant economic toll that violence against women exacts on women and their
employers').
198. See Mincavage, supra note 188, at 468.
199. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 39, 41-42 (1993) (estimating that the social costs of
domestic violence are 5 to 10 billion dollars per year and finding that "violence is the leading
cause of injury to women ages 15-44," and family violence is the largest threat of injury to adult
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ence [in order] to convert congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States."'
Relying on the argument that the cost of crime on the national econ-
omy meets the substantial effects test would render the Lopez multi-
ple inference proscription meaningless 1 because it allows Congress to
regulate almost any activity as long as it has some small, tenuous link
to interstate commerce."°2 To avoid this result, the Lopez majority spe-
cifically rejected "cost of crime" as a basis for finding substantial ef-
fects on interstate commerce."n
Whether the VAWA satisfies the Lopez standard remains un-
answered. Without guidance from the Court on the meaning of the
post-Lopez Commerce Clause, lower courts-and Congress-can ma-
nipulate the substantial effects test to produce desired results. Lo-
pezs failure to identify invalid precedent in its reinvigorated Com-
merce Clause analysis leaves rhetoric supporting both sides of the de-
bate. The inconsistency of the "controlling" case law gives each side
substantial support for its position and leaves courts navigating with-
out a map.
b. VAWA Under Functional Analysis
Functional analysis provides the courts a more detailed ana-
lytical map by asking who should regulate-the states or the national
government. While Congress may have deemed violence against
women a "national tragedy,"" functional analysis shows that it need
not craft national legislation.
Both concurrences in the Fourth Circuit en banc ruling hint at
the use of functional analysis in their decisions. Chief Judge Wilkin-
son urged that the question under the Commerce Clause "is not what
women in the United States); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994) reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839, 1853 (stating that violence against women deters women from "traveling
interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with busi-
nesses, and in places involved in interstate commerce.').
200. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567; see Mincavage, supra note 188, at 468; see also Brzonkala, 169
F.3d at 846 ("Lopez, however, cannot reasonably be understood to have turned on a mere lack of
documentation of the effects of the regulated conduct on interstate commerce."); id. at 851
("[A]lthough appellants repeatedly assert that the relationship described by these findings is
direct, it quite simply is not." (citations omitted)).
201. See Renshaw, supra note 197, at 842.
202. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567; Renshaw, supra note 197, at 842; see also Brzonkala, 169
F.3d at 859 ("[Tlhere is no reason that Congress must, under the logic of [the national govern-
ment], limit its reach to violent crime motivated by gender animus, rather than assume control
over the entire field of violent crimes, or, for that matter, all crime within all of the States.")
203. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64.
204. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993).
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the proper allocation of economic regulatory power ought to be, but
whether the states will have any subjects of social welfare to call their
own." Wilkinson described the "present jurisprudence of federalism
[as] purely allocative, standing for the simple proposition that the
Constitution does not cast states as mere marionettes of the central
government."'  Judge Niemeyer followed Wilkinson by noting that
"[ilf a federal regulation ostensibly justified by the Commerce Clause
unduly infringes on the general police power, a power that was never
conferred on the national government, it follows that such regulation
exceeds the limited federal power."'
While the concurrences to the en banc Brzonkala decision take
the first step towards functional analysis, further development of the
model must take place before courts will be able to apply it. In gen-
eral, the national government has a comparative advantage over the
states in regulating only a few fields. Circumstances call for national
regulations when the states have incentives not to regulate a behavior
in order to gain an advantage in the integrated national economy. For
example, states might race to the bottom by lowering standards in a
particular field to attract business and employees. In that case, the
national government could justifiably act because the competition for
business in the integrated national economy limits the freedom of
various states to craft different regulations and, sometimes, any
regulations at all. However, with respect to violence against women,
nothing in the nature of the integrated national economy prevents the
states from regulating-in possibly the exact same manner as the na-
tional government-and achieving similar (or better) results. States
can regulate the local behavior and the national legislation merely
duplicates their effort.
States retain the police power over people within their jurisdic-
tion. Because each state has an independent police power, differences
in criminal legislation are expected and encouraged.2" Differing state
legislation on violence against women does not impair-or even no-
ticeably affect-the integrated national economy. Though Congress
made the argument that abused women miss work, which adversely
affects the national economy,' this argument lacks the force neces-
sary to warrant national legislation. The absence of employees from
205. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 894 (4th Cir. 1999) (Wilkinson,
C.J., concurring), cert. granted sub nom., United States v. Morrison, 68 U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S. Sept.
28, 1999) (No. 99-5).
206. Id. at 895 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
207. Id. at 903 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
208. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 192.
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work may hurt business, but solving the problem does not require na-
tional legislation. State legislatures can independently address and
solve the problem. For Congress to invoke the commerce power, it
must do so only when achieving the desired policy outcome within the
integrated national economy requires national legislation.
Here, functional analysis sounds similar to the substantial ef-
fects test of Lopez: if a problem causes substantial national economic
harms, Congress can legislate. However, there is a distinct difference.
Lopez seeks a cause and effect relationship between local activities
and national effects. Functional analysis connects a desire to regulate
local activities with the need for national legislation to effectively ad-
dress the problem. It confines Congress to assertions of power on is-
sues that demand national legislation and prevents Congress from
usurping state power when public outrage on popular issues has
turned to Washington, D.C., rather than state capitals, for responsive
action. Violence against women remains a disturbing problem of na-
tional import, with broad support for legislation to prevent or punish
abuse, but the campaign for legislation can and should occur at the
state level instead of the national level.
2. The Constitutionality of the "Isolated Wetlands"
Regulation of the Clean Water Act
In the isolated wetlands context, the Lopez case rears its con-
fusing head yet again. The 'Isolated wetlands" regulation may meet
the standard set forth in Lopez. But, as shown above with respect to
the VAWA, functional analysis provides a more useful analytical tool.
As the following analysis shows, functional analysis will remedy the
confusing nature of the current Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
a. The "Isolated Wetlands"Regulation of the Clean Water Act
Under Lopez
As with the VAWA, the Clean Water Act's "isolated wetlands"
regulation likely falls into the third category of Lopezs permissible
legislation-substantial effects on commerce."'  Wilson involved
homebuilding, which, if not itself interstate commerce, closely resem-
bles interstate commerce. But the isolated wetlands regulation did
210. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). One could argue that isolated
wetlands are channels of interstate commerce. While this argument might work for the regula-
tion of navigable waters, it does not work for isolated wetlands. Because they are isolated, they
are exempt from the category-channels of interstate commerce.
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not regulate construction; it regulated draining the wetlands, regard-
less of the planned post-drainage use. With the government forced to
focus on the maintenance of the wetlands, the migratory bird rule at-
tempted to meet the substantial effects test:
The presence of migratory birds attracts scientists and amateur bird watchers, which
causes these people to spend money on gear to engage in study and observation of
birds. This expenditure is substantial and would be substantially reduced if landown-
ers were allowed to fill in potholes on their property that are only sporadically wet. Of
course, to substantially preclude or diminish this "commerce," in substantial numbers,
the birds would have to be so put off by the filling of their pothole landing pads that
they will die and fail to make it to other more hospitable wetlands for observation
there.2 11
Use of the migratory bird rule to validate the exercise of Commerce
Clause power has recently come under attack."u The migratory bird
rule is widely regarded as an ex post context-of-litigation justification
to slide the statute under Congress's Commerce Clause power.
A less fanciful argument for how this regulation meets the sub-
stantial effects test developed in response. Builders stand to make a
considerable amount of money by draining wetlandsY.2 3 A race to the
bottom could prevent regulation by the several states. In order to at-
tract business and boost their economies, states would compete to
adopt the most environmentally unfriendly policies. Contrasting the
facts of Lopez, which recognized that the economic implications of gun
possession near schools are limited, the regulation here has a direct
effect on economic incentives,21 ' meeting the substantial effects test of
interstate commerce.
There are also persuasive arguments demonstrating why nei-
ther of these justifications meets the Lopez standard. First, economic
analysis does not show that isolated wetlands affect interstate com-
merce to an extent sufficient to justify national regulation. The mi-
gratory bird rule carries no weight because neither Congress nor the
Corps has regulated all of the other activities that presumably consti-
tute the "commerce" of migratory birds.1 5 The lack of other regula-
tions makes the justification appear superficial, as if it were used to
support the regulation in court rather than provide the rationale that
211. Linehan, supra note 184, at 418-19.
212. See Cargill v. United States, 516 U.S. 955, 957-58 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dis-
senting from the denial of certiorari to Leslie Salt Co. v. United States because of the question-
able constitutionality of the migratory bird rule); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388,
1395 (9th Cir. 1995) (conceding that the migratory bird rule tests the limits of Congress's pow-
ers).
213. See Pirnot, supra note 162, at 398-99.
214. See J. Sloane Stricker, Note, Federal Wetland Jurisdiction Gets Swamped in the Fourth
Circuit: An Analysis of United States v. Wilson, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 225, 250-51 (1998).
215. See Linehan, supra note 184, at 417-18.
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animates its use in practice. While a "race to the bottom" justification
sounds persuasive at first blush, no evidence exists that this would
occur, and, if it did, that the market would not fix the problem on its
own. Without such proof, it is unclear whether the subject of the
regulation has any effect on interstate commerce at all. The lack of
such evidence shows that Congress has grounded its regulation on a
possible, instead of a true, effect on interstate commerce. If it cannot
find any effects on interstate commerce, the Court does not have to
ask the Lopez question of whether the effect is substantial.
Moreover, the above justifications for finding the statute a con-
stitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power pile up too
many inferences to reach the substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.216 The migratory bird rule requires numerous steps to reach its
ultimate, and only possible, effect on interstate commerce. 1' The "race
to the bottom" approach assumes that: (1) environmental regulations
contribute significantly to interstate business relocation; (2) states
would sacrifice their natural resources to attract business; (3) vast
numbers of developers would move to that state to develop the limited
number of isolated wetlands; and (4) such regulations would interfere
with interstate commerce by creating unfair competition. Reaching
the ultimate conclusion that the regulation substantially affects inter-
state commerce thus requires several tenuous logical steps. Lopez
warns that the Court will not "pile inference upon inference" to consti-
tutionalize the exercise of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause. 18
The analysis of whether the "isolated wetlands" provision is
constitutional could go either way. Yet again, the Lopez standard
lacks adequate direction to guide courts to a reasoned answer. The
substantial effects test's black letter principle can be manipulated by
courts such that it becomes a meaningless magic word. It lacks the
identification of an objective standard to guide the courts in their deci-
sions.
b. The "Isolated Wetlands"Regulation of the Clean Water Act
Under Functional Analysis
Functional analysis steps back from the issue and asks which
governmental body should regulate, the states or the national gov-
ernment. The nature of environmental problems makes functional
216. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
217. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
218. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
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analysis difficult. Environmental problems rarely confine themselves
to one state; they drift without regard to boundaries."9 The amor-
phous nature of many environmental problems complicates the analy-
sis of which entity should regulate.' The environment, like race dis-
crimination, is a thorn in the side of the Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. Both test the outer limits of the Commerce Clause, making
them candidates for poor precedent. Environmental problems often
transcend state borders, but they do not always call for national leg-
islation. Whether the states are able to legislate effectively and
whether the states will, when able, act in the way that interested citi-
zens across the country want them to act present difficult issues.
When confronted with an environmental problem, the ease of
expanding the Commerce Clause might tempt the court to vest power
over such difficult problems in Congress under the Commerce Clause's
umbrella. A similar temptation prompted the Court to stretch the
Commerce Clause to accommodate the Civil Rights Act of 1964." The
problem with making hard-issue exceptions to the otherwise reasoned
and intelligible jurisprudence is the precedent it creates. Congress
and future courts could read such a strained ruling as permission for
Congress to legislate on anything. The difficulty of the analysis and
the salience of environmental problems strains functional analysis no
less than traditional jurisprudence. Isolated pockets of wetlands that
are not even wet the entire year appear relegated to a specific area,
which arguably makes it easy for the states to regulate isolated wet-
lands without national help. However, some scientists urge that all
waterways are connected, and only by regulating each individual wa-
terway can one efficiently protect waterways of seemingly greater sig-
nificance.' If the environment is an integrated mass, it makes sense
that only a national policy can protect it-a national approach could
account for the effect one area has on another.
Yet a national policy may not be the success story that it at
first appears. When the national government takes action, local and
state environmental actors typically stop, relying on the assumption
219. See Norma Myers, The Question of Linkages in Environment and Development, 43
BIOSCIENCE 302, 302 (1993).
220. See ROD HAGUE ET AL., POLITICAL SCIENCE: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 111 (1992)
(stating that environmental problems are regarded as "everyone's problem-and therefore as no
one's [problem]').
221. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
222. See Lisa Wilson, Comment, Substantial Effect under Lopez: Using a Cumulative Impact
Analysis for Environmental Regulations, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 479, 502 (1998). The Act itself
seeks to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1994).
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that the national policy will solve the problem.' As noted above,
stunting local policy experimentation can leave in place a dysfunc-
tional national policy, with states unwilling--or unable, thanks to
preemption-to solve the problem. Additionally, macro-management
of the environment by the national government may not account for
the particular ecological needs and characteristics of the countless lo-
cal ecosystems that canvas the country. The characteristics of wet-
lands change from location to location. "What is considered wet in one
area of the nation, such as the arid southwest United States, may be
relatively dry for another area, such as Louisiana." "' Worthwhile mi-
cro-management from Washington, D.C., may prove extremely costly.
Nevertheless, the wisdom of particular policies and the efficiency of
national regulation should not determine the extent of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause. Judicial subjectivity in reviewing
policies creates a danger of each new issue changing the bounds of
Congress's power. Confusion and instability will inevitably result if
the meaning of the Commerce Clause turns on a scientific or efficiency
rationale.
Functional analysis provides stability by only allowing the na-
tional government to regulate when the integrated national econ-
omy-not the utility of particular policies-so demands. National
legislation under the Commerce Clause power cannot pass constitu-
tional muster under functional analysis without a connection between
the regulation and the integrated national economy. National legisla-
tion should only occur when realities of the national economy make
state action effectively impossible, leaving national action as the only
method of achieving the desired policy results. The notion that the
national government can do a better job simply does not suffice.
Differing state regulations of isolated wetlands will not impair
the smooth functioning of the integrated national economy. Moreover,
the national economy does not prevent states from adopting the regu-
lations they deem appropriate. Each state will engage in its own bal-
ancing of economic and environmental interests. Critically, each can
do so without regard to other states' decisions, as the market could
demand a race to the bottom (no regulation in return for homebuilding
opportunities) or a race to the top (plenty of regulations boosting
neighboring property values and encouraging tourism).
223. See HAGUE, supra note 220, at 111; see also Steven Teles, Think Local, Act Local. Civil
Environmentalism, NEW STATESMAN, Aug. 22, 1997, at 28.
224. Jon Kusler, Wetlands Delineation, An Issue of Science or Politics?, ENVT., Mar. 1992, at
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For most environmental regulations, protection of national
natural resources provides the appropriate connection to the inte-
grated national economy, justifying national legislation. "[W]hen state
legislation, or the lack thereof, threatens national interests, the coun-
try cannot afford to permit a state to function as a legislative labora-
tory because the risk cannot be confined to that state. In these rare
cases congressional interference is warranted."' As a general propo-
sition, cases in which local regulations threaten a particular national
economic interest are rare, and often turn on the extent to which in-
trastate action affects interests outside the state. However, particular
environmental resources-including certain waterways and airways-
routinely express the need for congressional legislation because the
risk to the integrated national economy posed by loss or destruction of
those resources cannot be confined to individual states.
Yet an isolated wetland stands as an exception to environ-
mental resources' routine need for congressional action because iso-
lated wetlands, in and of themselves, do not form part of the web of
natural resources that falls within the national interest. This difficult
and admittedly unusual result springs from the fact that the wetland
is, by its nature, isolated, a considerable distance from any navigable
waterway.
This result achieves the best of both worlds. First, it allocates
to the states some power over the environment, so that they have a
reason to act and experiment rather than leaving the entire process to
the national government. Second, the risks posed by experimenting
with regulation of isolated wetlands and other resources that do not
constitute national interests do not extend beyond the state itself.
However, once you move beyond isolated wetlands to wetlands more
closely connected to the national interest, the risks no longer remain
confined to a single state. Thus, national legislation becomes impera-
tive, as the states cannot be expected to adequately protect waterways
and related wetlands that form the nation's web of water resources.
V. CONCLUSION
The use of functional analysis in the dissection of the Violence
Against Women Act and the isolated wetlands provision of the Clean
Water Act offers several important insights. The Lopez decision pro-
vides inadequate guidance to lower courts on how to analyze Com-
225. Alan R. Greenspan, Note, The Constitutional Exercise of the Federal Police Power: A
Functional Approach to Federalism, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1052 (1988).
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merce Clause challenges. It provides a standard that can be manipu-
lated to produce both unconstitutional and constitutional interpreta-
tions. Functional analysis takes a practical approach by stepping
back from the law and asking which governmental body should regu-
late under the dual-sovereign constitutional system. It prevents
meaningless inquiries into the effect on commerce that, for example,
migrating birds might have, by asking the important question of
whether the several states can effectively regulate or the realities of
the integrated national economy create a functional need for national
action. Functional analysis does not leave the courts an easy task; it
calls for ad hoc, case-by-case judgments. However, it provides neces-
sary guidance that will prevent complete usurpation of the states'
power by the national government.
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